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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Within his Brief, dated February 11, 1992 the Substitute
Appellee, Paul H. Richins ("Richins"), has indicated no objection
to the "Statement of the Issues Presented for Review, " which
appears upon pages 1-3 of Appellants1

("Burtons") principal

brief, dated November 26, 1991.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although R i c h i n s '
" S t a t e m e n t of

Brief

contains

no o b j e c t i o n

F a c t s , " which appears on pages 5-16 of

to

the

Burton's

p r i n c i p a l b r i e f , R i c h i n s ' Brief contains a s e p a r a t e "Statement of

the Case" and "Statement of Material Facts," which include
numerous factual and legal assertions which Burtons dispute.
Rather than burdening the Court with a point-by-point refutation
of such assertions, many of which are clearly immaterial or
conclusory

in nature. Burtons hereby object to Richins'

"Statement of the Case" and "Statement of Material Facts" in
their entirety as not being authorized under URAP 24(b).

Burtons

reserve their objections to each specific factual allegation
within Richins' Brief, and respectfully refer the Court to
Burtons' principal Brief for the uncontested facts of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Burtons argue within Point I of their principal Brief that
notwithstanding Willard Wood's purported conveyance of his
interest within the Laura Kay property to his wife, Tonya Wood,
by Special Warranty Deed, dated May 1, 1980, Willard Wood had an
interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment lien
attached, during June of 1981.

Burtons maintain that, because

the conveyance from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was

admittedly

fraudulent,^ said conveyance was void in toto, and Burtons were
justified in disregarding such conveyance and in executing upon
^Mr. Wood expressly stated in his Deposition that the
purpose of his Deed to Mrs. Wood was to shield the property from
Mr. Wood's creditors. Wood Depo., pages 18-22.
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the interest of Mr. Wood, through his successors-in-interest, the
Baldwins.

Burtons further submit that DCA Section 25-1-15(2) of

the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act expressly authorized Burtons
to disregard the fraudulent conveyance and execute upon the
property.
Richins' primary response on this point is to repeat over
and over that Mr. Wood had no interest in the property at the
time that Burton's judgment was docketed, and that Burtons' lien
therefore did not attach to the property.

Burtons agree with

Richins1 statement that "If the property was not owned by him
[Mr. Wood] at the time, then no lien attached."

Richins Brief,

page 19. However, the issue in this case is whether Mr. Wood had
an interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment
was docketed, or subsequent thereto.2

Subsequent to Mr. Wood's May 1, 1980 Deed to Mrs. Wood,
Mr. Wood and Mrs. Wood executed the September 30, 1981 Warranty
Deed on the Property to Lynda and Gregory Baldwin. In addition,
prior to his conveyance to the Baldwins, Mr. Wood executed a
Trust Deed to Valley Bank and Trust Company as security for a
Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) loan. (Wood Depo., page 17
and Exhibit "5.") Therefore, even if the initial conveyance from
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was valid, it appears that the property was
subsequently reconveyed to Mr. Wood by the time that Baldwins
purchased the property. This conclusion is consistent with
Mr. Wood's testimony that he believed that he had an interest in
the property at the time he executed the Deed to Baldwins.
(R. 071, 235.) Since a judgment lien attaches to after-acquired
property of the debtor under UCA Section 78-22-1, Burtons' lien
attached at the time of any such reconveyance.
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Richins also argues that the fraudulent conveyance from
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was not void, but merely voidable, so that
Burtons could not directly execute upon the property without
first bringing an action to set aside the conveyance.
Brief, pages 31-34.

Richins1

In so arguing, Richins ignores the express

language of UCA Section 25-1-8, and of the four Utah cases which
were discussed on pages 19-20 of Burtons1 principal Brief.3
Instead, Richins

relies upon several

cases

from

other

jurisdictions, which are simply not controlling upon Utah law.
Richins

also

attempts

to draw support

v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).

from

Butler

However, contrary to

the assertion on page 39 of Richins' Brief, there is nothing
within Butler which implies that a fraudulent conveyance is
merely voidable.

To the contrary, page 1262 of Butler repeatedly

states that such conveyances are "void."

The holding in Butler

is that a creditor cannot disregard a fraudulent conveyance
and execute upon fraudulently conveyed property which is in the
hands of a third-party bona fide purchaser.

Butler does not

prohibit a creditor from disregarding a fraudulent conveyance and
executing upon property in the hands of a third party who is not
3

Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); W.P. Noble
Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op Inst., 42 P. 869
(Utah 1894) ; Meyer v. General American Corporations, 569 P.2d
1094, 1098 (Utah 1977); Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah
1944) .
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a bona fide purchaser.

Although Butler may be relevant to

Baldwin's claim that she is a bona fide purchaser (See Point III,
infra), Butler does not require that a creditor bring an action
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance whenever the property has
been conveyed to a third party.
Burtons raised an important point within Point II of their
principal Brief, which should have more properly been raised
under Point I.

That point is that the entire issue of fraudulent

conveyance is immaterial to this action because, for whatever
reason, Burtons1 judgment lien appears in the public record as
having attached to the property prior to Baldwin's purchase of
the property.

At the time of Burtons' execution, Burtons had no

knowledge of, or way of knowing about, any prior fraudulent
conveyance, nor did it appear that any fraudulent conveyance
could have any effect upon Burtons' lien.

At the time of

Burtons' execution, the record did indicate the May 1, 1980
Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood, but the record also reflected
Mr. Wood's May 26, 1980 Trust Deed to Valley Bank and Mr. Wood's
September 30, 1981 Deed to Baldwins, prior to which Burtons' lien
had attached.

Thus, it appears that the entire fraudulent

conveyance issue is peripheral in this case, and that the case
merely involves a straight-forward execution by Burtons and a
subsequent attempt by Baldwins to set aside the execution based
upon an error in the public records.
- 5 -

One of the elements of

Baldwins' action to set aside Burtons' execution was to establish
the validity of the May, 1980 Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood.
In defense to the merits of Baldwins' claim, Burtons properly
asserted the invalidity of the Deed.

Such defense did not

constitute an affirmative defense inasmuch as it contested
the merits of Baldwins' claim and did not seek to avoid the
claim.
POINT II
Burtons argued on pages 22-30 of their principal Brief that
the District Court erred in summarily concluding that any action
by Burtons to set aside a fraudulent conveyance between the Woods
was time-barred.
Burtons' primary point on this issue is that no action to
set aside the fraudulent conveyance was necessary, inasmuch as
Burtons merely sought to execute upon their judgment, for which
the applicable statute of limitations is the eight-year period
established by UCA Section 78-22-1.

Burtons held no way of

knowing that a fraudulent conveyance issue existed until Baldwins
filed this action, alleging that Mr. Wood had divested himself of
any interest in the property through the May lr 1980 Deed.
At the time of Burtons' execution, the record disclosed that
Burtons' lien had attached to the Property, and that Mr. Wood had
subsequently conveyed his interest to the Baldwins.

Based upon

that status. Burtons properly proceeded to execute upon their
lien.
- 6 -

Even if Burtons were required to pursue their claim against
the property within the time prescribed

for attacking a

fraudulent conveyance, an issue of fact exists as to when Burtons
should have discovered the fraudulent conveyance.
Richins argues that Burtons should have discovered the fraud
"(i) in May of 1980, when the Willard Wood Deed was recorded,
(ii) in June 1991, when the judgment was entered in the Burton
lawsuit; or (iii) in September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust Deed
and Woods' Deed were recorded and Baldwins took open and
notorious possession of the property."

Richins Brief, page 28.

Regarding May of 1980, Burtons had no claim against Mr. Wood
at that time, and no interest in the property.
Regarding June and September of 1981, Richins' Brief at page
29 describes the information which was available to Burtons on
those dates:
"Reasonable diligence" in collecting a money
judgment would require that at the time of or some time
after acquiring the Judgment, Burtons would research
the public record for any real property owned or
recently transferred by Willard Wood, particularly his
residence. Had they done so, Burtons would have
discovered not one, but three deeds: (i) the Willard
Wood Deed, recorded in May 1980, (ii) the Kofoed Trust
Deed, recorded in September 1981, and (iii) the Woods'
Deed, recorded in September 1981. Armed with such
information. Burtons could have easily deposed Willard
Wood to discover why he executed the two deeds in 1981
after he had conveyed his estate in 1980. If Burtons
then believed the 1980 deed was fraudulent in light of
the 1990 [sic] deeds, Burtons could have challenged it
then, in 1981, or within three years thereafter.
Therefore, the statute of limitations could begin to
run no later than September 1981, when the Kofoed Trust
Deed and Wood's Deed were recorded, and the Willard
Wood Deed was clearly evident.
- 7 -

Burtons submit that the record as of June and September
1980 could not have placed them or any other reasonable creditor
on notice of a fraudulent conveyance*

It is true that the May

1980 Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood would appear a little odd in
conjunction with the subsequent conveyance from Mr. Wood to
Baldwins, but Mr. Wood's execution of the Baldwin Deed, together
with his use of the property as security to Valley Bank, and the
record lien of the Burtons, would convince any

reasonable

creditor that its lien had properly attached, and could be
executed upon within the time established by UCA
78-22-1.

Section

Burtons deny Richins' assertion that Burtons could have

"easily deposed Willard Wood,n or that the status of the property
at that time was such that Burtons should have deemed it
necessary to commence a lawsuit.
Regarding the Deed to Baldwins and Baldwins" "open and
notorious possession" of the property, such events had no
necessary or even likely effect upon Burtons' lien.

Baldwins

merely took their interest in the property subject to Burtons'
lien.
POINT III
Within Point III of Burtons' principal Brief, pages 30-36,
Burtons argued that the District Court erred in holding that
Baldwins were bona fide purchasers ("BFP") of the property.
reasons that such holding was error are that:

The

(1) The Burton

judgment was of record, and imparted constructive notice of its
- 8 -

existence at the time Baldwins purchased the property; (2)
substantial issues of fact exist with respect to Baldwins' BFP
status; and

(3) Baldwins lost their BFP status through the

foreclosure of the Kofoed Trust Deed and Baldwins' subsequent
repurchase of the property.
There are actually two potential BFP issues in this case.
If the Court accepts Burtons' argument that this action involves
a straight-forward execution by Burtons that did not require the
setting aside of a fraudulent conveyance, then the only BFP claim
available to Baldwins is that they took the property without
notice of Burton's lien.

This claim is untenable because

Burtons' lien was of record and at least constructively known to
Baldwins at the time of their purchase.
If the Court should determine that Burtons' execution
required an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, the BFP
question is whether Baldwins obtained the property without
knowledge of the fraudulent transfer from Mr Wood to Mrs. Wood.
Burtons submit that an issue of fact exists with respect to this
point, considering that:

(1) the Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood

was of record; (2) Mr. Wood signed both the Baldwins Warranty
Deed and the Kofoed's Trust Deed, notwithstanding he had no
apparent interest in the property; (3) Mr. Wood had executed a
Trust Deed upon the property to Valley Bank, as security for a
loan which was paid off in conjunction with the sale to Baldwins;
(4) Baldwins knew that Mr. Wood was experiencing financial
- 9 -

difficulties at the time of the sale (Baldwin Depo., page 5); (5)
Mr. Wood testified that he executed the Warranty Deed to Baldwins
because he regarded himself as having an interest in the
property, notwithstanding his prior conveyance to Mrs. Wood
(R. 071, R. 235); (6) the recital in the August 23, 1981 Earnest
Money Agreement to the transfer of an unidentified lien and the
discrepancies in the testimonies of Mr. Wood and Mr. Baldwin
regarding such lien (Wood Depo., page 17; Baldwin Depo*, page 9 ) ;
(7) the fact that Baldwins' title agent, Western States Title
Co., had actual knowledge of the Burtons' judgment; and (8)
Mr. Wood executed the August 23, 1991 Earnest Money Agreement as
a "Seller."
Burtons submit that these facts are sufficient to avoid
summary judgment upon the BFP issue. Of course, neither Baldwins
nor Woods expressly admit any fraudulent conduct, as is usually
the case in actions alleging fraud.

However, fraud must often be

established through circumstantial evidence.

In the present

case, there is a substantial inference from the circumstances
that Baldwins knew of the questionable validity of Mrs. Wood's
purported exclusive ownership of the property.
Even if Baldwins were BFPs under the Warranty Deed from
Woods, Baldwins subsequently lost such BFP status. The Baldwins'
interest under the Wood Deed was foreclosed upon by Kofoed's
successor-in-interest during May of 1987 (R. 270). A Trustee's
Deed

was

subsequently

issued
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in favor of the Kofoed's

successor-in-interest

(R. 269-271).

Said Trustee's Deed was

subsequently assigned to Mr. Baldwin's employer, and was then
assigned to Mrs. Baldwin in October of 1987 (R. 280, 281). The
Baldwins provided no consideration for such assignment (Baldwin
Depo., pages 28-30).
The interest which Baldwins received from Woods, allegedly
as BFPs in September of 1981, was extinguished by the foreclosure
of the Kofoed Trust Deed in June of 1987.

When Lynda Baldwin

regained the property in October of 1987, she clearly had
knowledge of the alleged fraudulent transfer between the Woods,
and cannot claim to have received such interest as a BFP. 4
Richins1 primary argument on the BFP issue is that Baldwins
could not have had notice of Burtons' lien because Burtons had
no valid lien.

This is merely a boot-strapping of Richins1

argument about Mr. Wood not having had an interest in the
property.

Richins noticeably

ignores all of the factual

circumstances from which fraud may be inferred in this case.
POINT IV
Burtons argued in Point IV of their principal Brief, pages
37-39, that assuming arguendo the District Court properly vacated
Burtons' Sheriff Deed, it nevertheless erred in awarding Baldwin
^There is no evidence in the record as to whether Kofoeds
received their interest in the property as BFPs under the
September 30, 19 81 Trust Deed, and the District Court made no
finding on that issue. In any event, Kofoed's potential BFP
status should be immaterial in relation to a subsequent purchaser
who has actual knowledge of the alleged fraud.

her attorney's fees.

The District Court did not state the legal

basis for such award, but described the award as "damages."
Burtons' principal Brief argued that the possible theories
under which the District Court may have awarded attorney's fees
include:

(a) wrongful execution; (b) slander of title; or (c)

bad faith under UCA Section 78-27-56.

Richins' Brief, at pages

43-52, accepts these theories as the potential bases for the
District Court's award of Baldwin's attorney's fees.

Richins

also adds Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11 as a potential basis.
Whatever the legal basis for the award, the sine qua non for
an award of attorney's fees in this case is bad faith on the part
of the Burtons.

However, there is no evidence of bad faith by

the Burtons in this case.

Burtons merely executed upon their

judgment lien, which was of record.

In fact, if Burtons had not

conducted the execution, their lien would have been foreclosed
under the Kofoed Trust Deed.
On pages 45-46 of his Brief, Richins presents nineteen (19)
factors which he construes as evidence of Burtons' bad faith.
However, all of these factors, except one, merely constitute
legal conclusions based upon Richins' theory of the case.

The

only fact cited by Richins, which was also mentioned by the
District Court, was Burtons' alleged improper preparation of the
execution documents.
Burtons' August 6, 1986 Writ of Execution was against the
property of "Willard D. Wood."

(Richins' Brief, Exhibit "D.")
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All other execution documents were directed against the interest
of the Baldwins as "successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood."
As an initial matter, if Baldwins were not BFPs, then
Mr. Wood's Deed to Baldwins, like his previous Deed to Mrs. Wood,
was void and Burtons were entitled to execute upon Mr. Wood's
interest in the property.
merely clarified

The subsequent Execution and Praecipe

the status of Mr. Wood's interest in the

property, i.e., having been nominally conveyed to Baldwins.

The

technical discrepancy between the Writ of Execution and the other
documents was immaterial since Baldwins had no valid interest in
the property.
More importantly, whether or not Baldwins were fraudulent
transferees

in this case, Burtons conduct was

expressly

authorized by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j), which states:
(j) Where property is claimed by third person.
If an officer shall proceed to levy any execution on
any goods or chattels claimed by any person other than
the defendant, or should he be requested by the
judgment creditor so to do, such officer may require
the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, with good
and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages
that he may sustain by reason of the detention or sale
of such property; and until such undertaking is given,
the officer may refuse to proceed against such
property.
This provision apparently authorizes Burtons' actions in
this case, as did U.C.A. Section 25-1-15(2).

In any event, it

cannot reasonably be said that Burtons acted in bad faith.

POINT V
Burtons argued within Point V of their principal Brief,
pages 39-43, that even if the District Court properly awarded
Baldwins attorney's fees, it erred in including within such award
over Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) in "paralegal costs" on
the grounds that (a) Utah law does not authorize recovery of
paralegal expenses, and (b) even if such expenses are sometimes
recoverable, they should not be allowed in the present case,
where there is insufficient evidence of the attorney's control
over the expenses claimed by the paralegal.
Mr. Richins' billing contains huge blocks of time designated
merely as "research."

Further, Mr. Richins has apparently billed

for several items which have absolutely nothing to do with the
present action.

This case clearly illustrates the need for

close attorney supervision over the conduct of paralegals,
particularly with regard to billing practices.
Richins argues that there is no evidence that he acted
outside the supervision of Baldwin's attorney.
at 57.

Richins' Brief

However, such evidence appears within Richins' billing

statement itself and particularly within

its

substantial

deviation from the detailed manner in which Baldwins' attorney
accounted for his time.

Richins continues to act outside the

scope of attorney supervision in the present action.

While

Richins' technical legal standing to defend this appeal results
from his ownership of the money judgment against Appellants, his
_ 14 -

defense

of

relating

the appeal
to

the

c o v e r s numerous l e g a l

Baldwins'

real

issues

property

directly

rights.

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of those i s s u e s could p r e j u d i c e the Baldwins
beyond t h e

loss

of

a Seven Thousand E i g h t

Hundred

The
far

Dollars

($7,800.00) money judgment.
POINT VI
In Point VI of their principal Brief, Burtons responded to
Richins' argument that Willard Wood's bankruptcy in December or
1983 had the effect of voiding Burtons' lien.

Burtons cited 11

USC Section 506(d) and 524 and several cases which establish that
a judgment creditor has the option of disregarding the bankruptcy
and executing directly upon its lien.
Richins' only response to this is to say that Burtons' lien
could not pass through the bankruptcy because Burtons never had a
valid lien.

Richins' Brief, pages 20-21.

This is merely

boots-strapping the question of the validity of Burtons' lien.
Assuming that Burtons' did have a valid lien, Richins makes no
argument that such lien could not have been executed upon outside
of Mr. Wood's bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument,
Burtons pray that this Honorable Court reverse the decision of
the District Court and Order that Burtons' Sheriff Deed be
reinstated.

In the alternative, should the Court determine that
- 15 -

genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary
judgment for either party at this time, Burtons request that this
case be remanded to the District Court for action consistent with
this Court's decision.
DATED this

^

day of April, 1992.
PERKINSf.SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

DAVID H. fSCHWOBE
Attorney for Defendants Burton
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day of April, 1992.
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